Introduction
A growing interest in organizational learning (OL) in the past two decades has produced an exponential growth in the number of publications on the subject (Crossan and Guatto, 1996) . Fuelled by the insight (which is by now a truism) that organizations cannot hope to survive or thrive in increasingly dynamic and competitive environments without acquiring a capability to learn, this literature is addressed to audiences in academia who wish to understand how, when and why OL occurs, and to practitioners -managers and consultants -who wish to improve organizations in this respect. Given that OL has both descriptive and prescriptive facets, it is puzzling to note that the topic of what constitutes high-quality OL, which is relevant to both, received only scant and indirect attention in the prolific literature on OL and learning organizations. Our purpose is to narrow this gap in knowledge by presenting an empirical investigation of the differences between high-and low-quality OL. The importance of this distinction is suggested by the following episode, which appeared in the Israeli daily Maariv on 2 July 1997, concerning one organization's failure to learn from its experience:
On 31 June 1996, a foot soldier carrying a wireless set was electrocuted when the set's antennae made contact with an overhead high tension electric cable. This was the sixth accident of this kind experienced by Israel Defense Forces. A committee appointed to investigate two identical accidents two years prior to the present accident discovered that specific instructions that were issued as lessons learned from previous accidents (e.g. indicating high tension overhead cables in terrain analysis) had not been followed. Despite the military's apparent attempts to learn from its experience, the same failure repeated itself on several occasions.
As the episode shows, the Israel Defense Forces 'failed to learn' even though they went through the motions of conducting post-accident reviews and the appointment of an investigative committee. Thus, 'failing to learn' has two meanings: failing to engage in learning altogether and learning in an ineffective or unproductive fashion (Miner and Mezias, 1996) .
The distinction that we draw between high-and low-quality OL pertains, thus, to differences between high-quality OL, which can be regarded as effective, productive or valuable, and low-quality OL, which cannot be regarded as such. The ability to make such distinctions is interesting from a theoretical perspective, given the normative stance of some of the literature on organizational learning (Argyris and Schön, 1996) and much of the literature on learning organizations (Senge, 1990a) . It is also interesting from an applied perspective, given the need to guide prospective interventions and to evaluate the outcomes of implemented interventions.
How can the quality of OL be conceptualized? Three possible methods are: (1) to devise notions of quality from existing conceptualizations of organizational learning; (2) survey and systematize available notions of the quality of OL; and (3) develop a bottom-up conceptualization based on differences between processes that are distinct in terms of roughly conceived notions of OL 'quality', 'effectiveness' or 'productiveness.' Because the great diversity of OL conceptualizations hampers efforts of integration (Easterby-Smith, 1997; Friedman et al., in press), we opted for a bottom-up approach that is sensitive to available notions of quality.
Given the failures to produce a generally applicable definition of organizational effectiveness (Goodman and Pennings, 1977) , it is not surprising that our literature survey revealed that there is no direct treatment of the issue of the quality of OL. The literature relevant to the latter subject indicates that a conceptualization of OL should include three aspects of this phenomenon: the outcome of learning; the process of learning; and the context of learning.
The outcome aspect of the quality of OL is defined by the fact that OL is generally assumed to produce some change in the organization (Argyris and Schön, 1996; Huber, 1991; Levitt and March, 1988) . More generally, it is possible to divide the outcomes of OL into cognitive outcomes (e.g. knowing a new procedure or developing a new mental model), behavioral outcomes (e.g. knowing to produce a new behavior) and normative outcomes (e.g. acquiring a new set of basic assumptions and shared outcomes). Regardless of the type of outcome, the association of OL with some outcome implies that high-quality OL should differ from low-quality learning in its probability to produce a desirable outcome or avert the occurrence of an undesirable outcome.
Since OL does not necessarily produce desirable outcomes, a desirable outcome is a necessary but not sufficient indicator of high-quality OL. A more adequate conceptualization will also pertain to the processes that are likely to produce highquality outcomes. For example, Argyris and Schön (1996) distinguish between two processes of inquiry, single-loop learning which is limited to improving the probability of goal achievement within an existing framework of assumptions, values and goals, and double-loop learning that includes critical examination and possible reframing of this framework. Double-loop learning can be considered to be of higher quality because effective solution of some problems requires the examination of sensitive 'undiscussable' issues, and the reframing of assumptions, values and goals. In addition, the governing values of double-loop learning -valid information, free and informed choice, and internal commitment to the choice and constant monitoring of its implementation -ensure the continuation of inquiry by reducing the likelihood of disruptive self-sealing 'defensive routines'.
Similar to Argyris and Schön (1996) , Lipshitz et al. (2002) also attribute the likelihood of productive learning (broadly defined as a systematic process which yields valid information, and results in actions intended to produce new perceptions, goals and/or behavioral strategies) to the existence of shared values that promote learning. The five values that Lipshitz et al. posited were transparency (the willingness to expose one's thoughts and actions to others in order to receive feedback), integrity (the willingness to seek and provide information regardless of its implications), issue-orientation (focusing on the relevance of information to the issue under consideration regardless of the social standing or rank of source or recipient), inquiry (persisting in investigation until full understanding is achieved) and accountability (the willingness to assume responsibility for learning and for the implementation of lessons learned).
Other distinctions between types or levels of OL that connote differences in quality (Fiol and Lyles, 1985; Gibb, 1995; Senge, 1990a) were discussed by Cope (2003) . These distinctions, which generally pertain to differences between 'more practical, routine, adaptive learning and more fundamental learning that generates new understandings and new cognitive [structures, e.g., mental models]' (Cope, 2003: 432) , do not spell out the relationship between different types of OL and OL productiveness in the manner of Argyris and Schön (1996) or Lipshitz et al. (2002) .
Finally, numerous authors linked the likelihood of OL (and its beneficial outcomes) to the operation of facilitative factors (or the absence of disruptive influences) in the context of learning (Huber, 1991; Levitt and March, 1988; Nevis et al., 1995; Shaw and Perkins, 1992; Yeung et al., 1999) . The elements of the psychological, policy and contextual facets of Lipshitz et al.'s (2002) multi-facet model are representative of these factors: a sense of psychological safety; reciprocal commitment between the organization and its members; commitment of the organization's leadership to learning and its tolerance for error; an appropriate task structure and proximity to the core tasks of the organization; high cost of potential error; and environmental uncertainty.
In conclusion, the literature on OL quality is relatively scarce and fails to focus on compelling and useful definitions of the antecedents, processes and outcomes of high-quality OL. Working to fill this gap we designed a model of the antecedents, processes and products of high-learning OL inductively, by capturing the differences between the high-and low-level episodes of OL in an organization that systematically operates mechanisms of organizational learning.
Method

Research Site
The basic research strategy was grounded theory (Glaser and Strauss, 1968; Charmaz, 1995) . The organization in which the study was conducted was an elite combat unit in the Israel Defense Force. The unit was selected for three reasons:
(1) informal impressions that it maintained systematic OL activities; (2) its responsibility for combat operations as well as for operational doctrine and training, permitting us to observe the complete chain of antecedents, processes and consequences of OL in a compact organizational entity; and (3) a unique degree of the research team's accessibility to and cooperation with the unit's commander and members.
Preliminary Studies
The study was preceded by two preparatory phases. To ascertain the existence of systematic OL in the unit, a representative sample of 69 officers and NCOs (who did not participate in the main study) were asked to respond to a 46-item questionnaire measuring OL activities (Ellis and Globerson, 1996) . Comparison of the results with those obtained in five different organizations showed that the unit had the highest overall score on three of the questionnaire's five subscales and second-highest score on the remaining two, confirming the feasibility of observing OL processes in the unit.
Thirty officers at different levels in the unit were interviewed in the second phase of the study to learn about OL in the unit and to identify the high-and lowquality episodes to be studied in depth in its main phase. The interviews revealed the operation of six OL mechanisms in the unit, with after-action reviews, performed routinely after operational and training activities, regardless of success or failure, being the dominant OL mechanism. The unit's culture emphasized continuous improvement, frankness and the veracity of operational and postoperational reports.
Design
Two episodes of high-quality and two of low-quality learning, as assessed by the interviewees in the first phase of the study, were selected for in-depth analysis, based on the frequency of reference (14, 3, 9 and 5 interviewees), and security restrictions. All episodes concerned training accidents in the unit's training facility. The episodes' chronological arrangement (L, H, H, L) allowed for a comparison between aggregate features of the high-and low-quality episodes and to track the short-term implementation and longer-term resilience of lessons learned.
Data Collection
Interviews
Six officers who were involved in episodes 3 and 4 and seven officers who were involved in episodes 1 and 2 and who did not participate in phase 1 of the study volunteered to be interviewed, carried out by the first author. The semi-structured interview protocol consisted of the following questions:
1. In a preliminary study interviewees mentioned the after-action review following incident X as an episode of organizational learning. What was your position at the time of the incident, and when and how did you first learn of it? 2. Please recount what happened in the incident. 3. How was information collected following the incident? 4. Which learning mechanisms (or learning activities) were used after the incident and what was the function of each mechanism? 5. How was each mechanism operated and who participated in their operation? 6. What was the atmosphere in each mechanism? 7. What can be learned about the unit from the operation of these mechanisms? 8. How were the subjects for investigation determined? 9. How was each subject investigated? 10. Which conclusions and lessons learned were derived and how? 11. In your opinion, were the appropriate conclusions and lessons learned derived? 12. How were the conclusions and lessons learned disseminated throughout the unit? 13. Was there a systematic follow-up of the implementation of lessons learned?
How, and for how long, was it continued? 14. Were lessons learned absorbed in the unit? 15. In your opinion was the learning process of high or of low quality? Why? 16. In your opinion what is high-quality OL? 17. Did an external committee investigate the incident? 18. Did the external committee's investigation affect the unit's own learning process? 19. Describe the process of the external investigation. 20. What role did the commander play in the entire process?
Archival Data
All documentary data available in the unit on each episode were collected for analysis. These included documents regarding the incident that was investigated, documents regarding the after-action review process (e.g. minutes of meetings, reports of committees and inspections) and documents regarding changes in standard operating procedures emanating from the after-action reviews.
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Data Analysis
Analysis followed Weiss's (1994) sequence of: (1) line by line coding; (2) local integration (constructing a model for each episode); and (3) general integration (constructing an overall model of high-quality organizational learning).
Coding
Coding was performed by the first author in an iterative process in conjunction with intensive discussions with the second and third authors who read the interviews and reviewed the selection of codes, their assignment to specific text segments, and the products of each intermediate phase of the analysis outlined below. Sixty-seven codes were generated corresponding to the interview questions (e.g. external investigative committee), Lipshitz et al.'s (2002) model (e.g. learning values), or to the unit, its OL process, and to high-versus low-quality OL in general (e.g. fighting sub-units; areas of specialization) The number of codes was reduced by clustering the codes relevant to high-versus low-quality OL in 22 bi-polar codes representing general attributes (or criteria) of OL quality. These were partly inspired by the literature and partly derived literally from the transcripts and formed five clusters corresponding to the different phases of the OL process (see Table 1 for representative quotes from each episode to which the criteria applied):
1. General aspects. The extent to which learning is designed systematically; executing information search, drawing conclusions and decision making as distinct stages; the centrality of the learning (i.e. post-accident review) process in the organization; involving the organization's members in the learning process; the extent to which organization members perceive the external committee's contribution as legitimate; mindfulness (i.e. attention to details and warning signs [Weick and Sutcliffe, 2001] ); the commander's receptivity to suggestions; relaxed atmosphere during learning; the commander's support of learning activities. 2. Information search and analysis. The breadth of subjects selected for investigation; the values of inquiry (Lipshitz et al., 2002) ; integrity (as in Lipshitz et al., 2002) , to which interviewees refer as veracity in reporting; transparency (Lipshitz et al., 2002) ; and issue orientation (Lipshitz et al., 2002) . 3. Drawing conclusions and lessons learned. The extent to which conclusions and lessons learned are deemed correct and appropriate by the organization's members; the commander's ability to take decisions; the extent to which the commander's conclusions and decisions are impartial; double-loop learning (Argyris and Schön, 1996) . 4. Implementation. The value of accountability (Lipshitz et al., 2002) ; documentation of lessons learned and the learning process; dissemination of lessons learned to relevant units. 5. Assimilation (the long-term absorption of lessons learned in the organization's culture and modus operandi). It is important to note that the identification of criteria in specific episodes relied not only on interviewees' explicit references such as those illustrated in Table 1 but on their reports of observable behaviors consistent with them.
Local Integration
Following the initial coding a single version of each episode was reconstructed. These were presented as detailed scripts studded with verbatim quotes from the interviews and archival material, and as a chronological table detailing the sequence of activities comprising the post-accident review process, its purpose, participating parties and output. Next the tables were converted to chronologically ordered flow charts summarizing the episodes' principal events. Finally, a model of the learning process in each episode was constructed in the form of a chronologically ordered cause map. Similar to Snook (2000) , maps were constructed by backward folding of elements, looking at each stage for those criteria of quality (from the 22 identified during coding) which could plausibly account for the transition from one event to the other.
Overall Integration
Overall integration was achieved by combining the common elements of the four models constructed separately for each episode into a general model of organizational learning quality.
Consistency Checks
Two procedures were used to test the consistency of the analysis. The reliability of coding was tested by calculating the inter-rater agreement between the principal author and an independent analyst who coded four particularly rich interviews using the final 22 codes set. The resulting 87% agreement was satisfactory for research purposes. The coherence of the coding and case designation was tested by examining the frequency distributions of the positive and negative criteria of highand low-quality learning of the entire data set (as coded by the second analyst who was blind to their designation) in the episodes of high-and low-quality OL. The significant Wilcoxon test of the difference between the two distributions (p < .05) was in the hypothesized direction, showing that the designation of the episodes as representing high-or low-quality learning by one set of unit members in the first phase of the study was consistent with their coded depictions by an independent set in the second phase of the study.
Results
The findings regarding each episode are organized around a flow chart that outlines the events comprising the learning process and a cause map representing their explanation by the quality criteria identified in the interview transcripts. Only two of the detailed case analyses will be presented owing to space constraints. 
Episode 1
Episode 1 concerned the death of a soldier during a training exercise. The postaccident review was divided into four phases (Figure 1 ): information gathering; the determination of lessons learned; implementation; and activities designed to ensure their long-term assimilation. As soon as it was realized that a soldier was missing, several debriefings were conducted in order to assess the situation and direct the search. These were followed by a more systematic review in the presence of the unit commander and his deputy. An investigative committee was appointed by the commander of the Corps to which the unit belonged and began its work four hours after the accident, interviewing officers and soldiers who participated in the exercise and (later on) relevant members of the unit. The military police also began an investigation, according to Army regulations. The unit followed up its initial after-action review with a more extensive review. No details are available on this process. Assuming that it followed the regular format of such processes in the unit, the commanding officers and other participants described the objectives, planning and execution of the exercise from their different perspectives, and answered follow-up questions by other participants in the review which was concluded by the commander's decisions on lessons learned regarding changes in training procedures, combat doctrine and logistics. These largely overlapped with the external committee's conclusions that were presented three days later. Three internal committees were appointed to work out the details of the lessons learned and translate them into changes in training procedures (including after-accident search activities), combat doctrine and logistics. Three weeks after the accident the unit held a final review conference attended by all high-and middle-rank officers. At the end of the conference participants received a document summarizing the lessons learned from the accident. There is also evidence that refresher 'safety symposia' were held later on. Figure 2 is a cause map representation of episode 1 in terms of the quality criteria identified in the interview transcripts. The map was constructed by identifying the final outcome of the episode and working out the sequence that links it to its root cause by looking for evidence regarding the working of quality criteria that can account for each step in the sequence. Element labels are intended as common denominators of the criteria which they contain. Criteria that appeared in the interviews that were irrelevant to the episode's causal account were not included in the cause maps (i.e. low-quality episodes occasionally manifested positive criteria and vice versa).
Tracing the episode backward from its final outcome to the latter's root causes, the episode concluded with a faulty assimilation: a second soldier died under almost identical circumstances in a later accident (episode 2) because the key lesson learned of episode 1 was not implemented at that time (criterion 22). Two factors can account for this outcome. First, the lessons learned apparently provided ineffective solutions to the causes of the accident, as they were hotly contested both during and after the review process (criterion 15). Furthermore, simplistically conceived (criterion 18), they stressed safety at the expense of operational suitability, ignoring the unit's macho culture which emphasized mission accomplishment even in the face of small odds and great risks, virtually ensuring that this solution would gradually erode. The second factor is members' Naot et al.: Discerning the Quality of Organizational Learning 461 lack of commitment to the lessons learned (criterion 4). This may have resulted partly from the perceived inappropriateness of the lessons learned and the marginal involvement of the unit's members in the post-accident process (criterion 3). Members' lack of commitment to the lessons learned can also be traced to the commander's leadership style (mediated by low mindfulness, criterion 6) which was marked by low receptivity to others' suggestions (criterion 7) and his lack of support (criterion 9) -he was regarded by himself and by others as 'The Expert' on the relevant combat technique and was generally disinclined to change the status quo. Lack of mindfulness (criterion 6) manifested itself in a somewhat blasé attitude to signals of possible malfunctions, persistent following up of the implementation of lessons learned, and reluctance to invest in costly safety measures before accidents occurred. The ineffectiveness of the lessons learned can be attributed to several factors: the commander's lack of reception and the nonproductive internal post-accident review process. The latter was relatively brief and narrow in scope (criterion 12), short-changed the analysis while focusing on implementation (Figure 1) , and lacked the values of inquiry (criterion 13) and issue-orientation (criterion 16). It can also be traced to the ineffectiveness of the external committee, whose investigation was likewise hasty and narrow in scope (Figure 1) , and lacked credibility owing to the perceived low expertise of its members which prevented them from properly diagnosing the accident and proposing effective solutions (criteria 5 and 10). The non-productiveness of the internal post-accident review process can be attributed to its flawed design -its overemphasis on implementation (criterion 1) can be attributed to the commander's leadership style -he took charge of directing the process and thus was responsible for it formally and factually.
In conclusion, the identification of episode 1 as an example of low-quality OL in the preliminary phase of the study was confirmed by the chronological and causal reconstruction of its post-accident review based on participants' and documentary data. The chronological and causal reconstruction are mutually consistent. The process was ill-designed, brief and superficial, produced ineffective solutions and failed to gain both the minds and the hearts (i.e. commitment) of the unit's members. The chronology of the review reveals a relatively brief process that was short on analysis and strong on the emphasis on the implementation of lessons learned. Its causal reconstruction reveals that lessons learned were not assimilated into the modus operandi of the unit, with the result that the same accident recurred. The root cause of this failure was the commander's leadership style, which can be linked to this failure by a plausible causal chain consisting of a subset of the criteria of the quality of OL identified in the interviews. Fixing the assimilation of lessons learned (as distinct from short-term implementation) as the bottom-line criterion of the post-review process is reasonable because it tests both their suitability to the unit's operational requirements and their ability to withstand changes in personnel. Analysis of episode 2, whose after-accident review of the recurring problem and death of a soldier was designated as an exemplar of high-quality OL in the preliminary study, produced a mirror image of these findings.
Episode 2
This episode occurred under the succeeding commander during episode 1. The accident involved the disappearance and death of a soldier in a nighttime exercise of the same combat technique as in episode 1. The flow chart of the after-accident review process is presented in Figure 3 . The deputy commander, who arrived on the scene after the soldier was declared missing, debriefed the officers and soldiers to assess the situation and direct the search. Additional debriefings were held later on during the search on the grounds and in the commander's office. No conclusions were drawn from these activities which aimed solely at gathering information. Two external investigations were also started that night, one by the Military Police, and the other by an external committee appointed by the Corps commander and chaired by a senior officer on leave from the unit and about to return to it. An initial after-action review was held in the unit four days after the accident. Its findings were passed on to an after-action review which was held by the Corps commander on the same day, and an after-action review by the IDF Chief of Staff a day later. The external committee submitted its report a week after the accident. The report did not identify the cause of the accident but proposed three hypotheses, one of which was considered as more likely. It also presented 22 recommendations of which two were also recommended by the external committee in episode 1 but were not implemented. This time the commander accepted '90% of the recommendations as is and made changes consistent with the remaining 10%'. Eight days after the accident the unit began an in-depth processing of the conclusions and lessons learned of the first phase of the postaccident review process. This was performed by five subject-matter committees on weaponry, doctrine, training, standard operating procedures and medicine. The committees were not limited to subjects immediately relevant to the accident. Rather, they were instructed to conduct extensive and thorough studies of their purviews of investigation. Each committee was headed by the most senior officer knowledgeable in the subject matter in the unit. Another senior officer headed a steering committee that coordinated the work of the subject-matter committees. The committees met first weekly and then once every two weeks. They prioritized their agendas so that subjects required for their routine operation were dealt with first. The committees' work proceeded simultaneously with the unit's regular operational and training activities and interacted with them: lessons learned were put to a test and the results of their implementation were fed back to the committees for further improvement or final acceptance. The extensive lessons learned and operational decisions as well as the review process were summarized and documented. Detailed implementation instructions were passed on to the relevant subunits and elements in the Corps command. Follow-up symposia on the lessons learned and inspection of their implementation were carried out during the two years following the accident to ensure their assimilation into the unit's routine mode of operation. Figure 4 presents a causal model of the post-accident review process of episode 2. Except for certain dissimilarities that are noted below, Figure 4 is a positive mirror image of Figure 2 . Three years after the accident, an inspection by the Corps command revealed that all the lessons learned in the post-accident review were implemented and practiced (except for certain long-range equipment changes that were still in process) (criterion 22) owing, no doubt, partly to activities specifically designed to facilitate assimilation such as extensive refresher activities (e.g. symposia in which episode 2 was reviewed) and consistent long-term inspections of the lessons learned application, and, prior to that, partly due to active implementation that included extensive documentation (20) and careful dissemination (21) involving intensive interaction between the post-accident review committees and their 'clients' -the operational units.
Moving one level up we posit again that the antecedents of active implementation were a motivational factor -members' commitment -and cognitive-pragmatic factor, the perceived effectiveness of the lessons learned (15, 18) . Regarding the latter, what is particularly noteworthy is the learning team's ability to identify the double bind that trapped unit members, on the one hand, between the macho norm of risk taking for mission accomplishment and, on the other hand, safety requirements. Exemplifying double-loop learning the unit set out to instill in the combat unit a norm that 'the truly professional fighter is a cautious fighter'.
The effectiveness of the lessons learned can be primarily attributed to the productiveness of the internal review process which was characterized by a relaxed, non-blame-seeking atmosphere (8), wide-scoped investigation (12), and the values of inquiry (13), integrity (14), and issue orientation (16). This, in turn, was 466 Management Learning 35(4) facilitated by the well organized post-accident review process (1) which relied on extensive gathering of information, the thorough processing of this information by several subject area committees, and careful separation among information search, conclusion drawing, decision making, implementation and monitoring of implementation. It was also helped by the credibility of the external committee whose contributions were explicitly acknowledged and accepted by the unit, and which helped to set the agendas of the five committees that performed the bulk of the work in the post-accident review process. Member commitment can be attributed to the centrality of the post-accident review process (which involved a good number of unit members even as the unit had a heavy operational workload), the commander's participative and empowering leadership style, and the mindfulness which he instilled (manifested by many instances of noticing of irregularities and learning from experience in the interview transcripts). The commander's pervasive influence on the process led us to posit him, again, as the root cause of the episode's, this time positive, final outcome.
In conclusion, the chronological and causal analyses of episode 2 confirm its designation in the preliminary study as an exemplar of high-quality OL. Indeed, the episode was hailed by our interviewees as a benchmark for post-accident reviews. The bottom-line criterion of successful assimilation was achieved through assimilation-enhancing activities, systematic dissemination, double-loop learning that enlisted both internal and external resources of knowledge available to the unit, and a policy of widespread participation and empowerment that won the hearts, as well as minds, of the unit's members. The post-accident review was taken as an opportunity for the in-depth review of a broad range of subjects in the unit's mode of operation. Explicit references to the commander's role in designing the process and empowering the people involved again justifies the positioning of his leadership style as the root cause of the successful outcome of this episode's post-accident review process.
Discussion
The prolific literature on OL includes scant empirical investigation and discussion of the context, process and products of high-quality OL. This lacuna is surprising, given that OL has clear normative and prescriptive underpinnings. The aim of the present study was to address this gap through the in-depth analysis of two successful and two unsuccessful after-action reviews, a well documented OL mechanism (Baird et al., 1997; Carrol, 1995; Cusumano and Selby, 1995; Ron et al., 2004) . Our findings produced an input-process-output model consisting of 22 indicators of high-quality OL, which can be summarized in the form of three propositions:
1. The outcomes of high-quality OL are effective lessons learned that are assimilated into the organization's mode of operation. 2. Assimilation is contingent on gaining the hearts and minds of the organization's members, i.e. persuading them that the lessons learned are appropriate and feasible, and engaging their commitment to the latter's persistent implementation. To this end, processes of high-quality OL are systematic and mindful, enlist internal and external sources of knowledge, and engage members in active participation. In addition, such processes are embedded in a culture of learning, that is, they are predicated on the assumption that learning is useful, and are guided by shared values of inquiry, integrity, transparency, issue orientation and accountability. 3. The immediate context of high-level OL consists of a receptive and supportive leadership that induces psychological safety. We turn to examine these propositions in some detail. that leadership is the single most important factor in determining fluctuations of quality between different episodes of learning in the same Organizational Learning Mechanism (OLM) in the same organization, at least in the military. Specifically, the unit's commanders in the present study determined the quality of learning by differentiating (or failing to differentiate) the phases of information search and analysis, checking on the implementation of lessons learned, encouraging subordinate's participation and ensuring their psychological safety (a facilitative factor emphasized by Edmondson [1996] , Lipshitz et al. [2002] and Schein [1993] ). To achieve these effects commanders exercised a leadership style characterized by deliberateness, receptiveness to the ideas of others, impartiality, and, particularly when learning from failure, emphasized their own accountability and refrained from blaming others. These findings regarding the role of leadership in productive learning are particularly important given that all four episodes can be considered as discontinuous events which presumably trigger 'higher level learning' (Cope, 2003) . The present study has two additional contributions to the insights summarized above. First, it offers a relatively rich description of how one organization attempts to learn from its experience in circumstances of failure and loss of lives which both stimulate learning (Lipshitz et al., 2002; Wong and Weiner, 1981 ) and make it difficult (Edmondson, 1996) . In addition it proposes a framework that can be used to gauge the quality of OL efforts in real-world organizations. Both the components of this framework and the posited causal links between them seem plausible, both in terms of the extant literature discussed in the paper, and in terms of the perceptions of our interviewees. Nevertheless, the framework has several limitations. First, it is based on a functional approach to organizational learning (which though unavoidable for addressing questions of quality, is not necessarily the only approach to OL). Second, it is particularly suitable for after-action or post-project reviews and other forms of learning from experience, and requires adaptation to other forms of OL, for example communities of practice. Finally, it was developed from observations of a fairly unique military organization that suggests caution in its application to other organizational types. These reservations highlight the fact that the present study was an exercise in model building which, naturally, should be followed by additional studies of model testing. Even so, the framework can serve usefully as a 'conceptual framework . . . that directs researchers' [and practitioners'] attention toward particular aspects of the real world, to distinctions and relationships which "common sense" often does not take into account . . . [and to] define the necessary questions which must be asked [without] seeking to provide automatic answers' (Mack, 1975: 199) .
